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Democracy on a Shoestring
Joshua S. Sellers*
Roger Michalski**
Democracy requires money. Voters must be registered, voting rolls
updated, election dates advertised, voting technology purchased and tested, poll
workers trained, ballots designed, votes counted and verified, and on and on.
Despite the importance of election expenditures, we have a shamefully
inadequate amount of information about how much our elections cost. This
Article, based on a novel and painstakingly hand-coded dataset, provides much
needed information on election expenditures across multiple years from four
states: California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida. These states, given their unique
characteristics, provide a compelling sample set.
In what we believe to be a completely novel approach to the collection of
election expenditure data, we supplement our hand-coded data with predictive
machine learning. This allows us to estimate average annual election spending
across multiple government units. Our findings, unsurprisingly, reveal great
variation both across and within states. But our findings also reveal that much
of the variation is seemingly unconnected to poverty, race, and other traditional
explanations of electoral disadvantage. This brings into question many basic
assumptions legislators, courts, and scholars harbor about election
expenditures. Our findings implicate not only policy discussions about election
funding but also the limitations of doctrinal interventions and judicial remedies
that are divorced from issues of resource allocation.
The Article proceeds in five parts: Part I provides background on
election funding, including a discussion of election costs and what the most
common funding sources are. This Part also discusses election law doctrines
and how they do not directly consider election expenditures. Part II outlines our
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data and methods. Part III presents our main findings. Part IV responds to the
findings and explores potential doctrines under which election expenditures
might be considered. Part V weighs the pros and cons of several nondoctrinal
proposals for election administration reform.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2017, Representative Blake Farenthold, a member
of Congress from Texas’s Gulf Coast, announced that he would not be
seeking reelection.1 His announcement followed public allegations
made by, among others, two former press secretaries that he “had an

1.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Blake Farenthold, Texas Congressman Accused of Sexual
Harassment, Will Not Run Again, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/
14/us/politics/blake-farenthold-texas-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/9N7H-Y222].
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explosive temper, berated them repeatedly, made sexually explicit jokes
and engaged in casual sexual banter that set a tone followed by his
underlings.”2 He ultimately resigned in April 2018.3 In the wake of
Farenthold’s resignation, Texas governor Greg Abbott called for a
special election to replace him, despite the fact that his successor would
potentially serve only a few months.4 The special election was strongly
opposed by county officials who were forced to use emergency funds to
cover the costs.5 “This election is costing us what we don’t have,” said
one county official.6
The episode highlights a simple truth: democracy requires
money. Voters must be registered, voting rolls updated, election dates
advertised, voting technology purchased and tested, poll workers
trained, ballots designed, votes counted and verified, and on and on. All
of this can be done well or poorly. Regrettably, “[n]o one knows how
much it costs to run elections in the United States.”7
While keen observers of the electoral terrain warn of election
“meltdowns”8 and “emergencies”9 that threaten our electoral process,

2.
Id.
3.
Farenthold Resigns from Congress, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/06/
farenthold-resigns-from-congress-507059 (last updated Apr. 6, 2018, 5:40 PM) [https://perma.cc/
72MB-ZU9V].
4.
Patrick Svitek, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Schedules June 30 Special Election to Fill U.S.
Rep. Blake Farenthold’s Seat, TEX. TRIB., https://www.texastribune.org/2018/04/24/texas-gregabbott-special-election-blake-farenthold-june-30 (last updated Apr. 24, 2018, 4:00 PM)
[https://perma.cc/45LW-95SQ].
5.
Didi Martinez, Texas Officials Rage Against ‘Crazy’ Farenthold Election, POLITICO (June
26, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/26/blake-farenthold-election-texas674865 [https://perma.cc/P7L6-FCSN] (“County officials say expenses associated with a special
election are forcing them to reach into their contingency funds – accounts set up to cover
government emergencies – or significantly downsize their operations.”).
6.
Id. (quoting Caldwell County Elections Administrator Pam Ohlendorf).
7.
Katy Owens Hubler & Wendy Underhill, Election Costs: Who Pays and with Which
Funds?, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/election-costs-who-pays-and-with-which-funds.aspx
[https://perma.cc/
BGP4-TSK4]; see Zachary Mohr, Martha Kropf, JoEllen Pope, Mary Joe Shepherd & Madison
Esterle, Election Administration Spending in Local Election Jurisdictions: Results from a
Nationwide Data Collection Project 2 (July 26–27, 2018) (unpublished paper from 2018 Election
Sciences, Reform, and Administration Conference), https://esra.wisc.edu/wp-content/
uploads/sites/1556/2020/11/mohr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLM6-XHVB] (“While U.S. policymakers
have provided for more centralized data concerning voter turnout, provisional votes and registered
voters, no scholars that we know of have unearthed cost data in a systematic way nationwide.”).
8.
See RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION MELTDOWN: DIRTY TRICKS, DISTRUST, AND THE THREAT
TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2020); RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO
THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012).
9.
Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of Natural Disasters and
Terrorist Attacks, 67 EMORY L.J. 545, 547 (2018) (“Most state election codes do not contain
provisions that specifically attempt to mitigate the impact of public health crises, extreme weather
events, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other calamities (collectively, ‘emergencies’) on the
electoral process.”).
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often elided is the more consequential yet prosaic issue of election
funding. State and local election officials cite insufficient resources as
their chief concern.10 Whether seeking to update voter registration
databases, overhaul election security programs in response to Russian
interference in the 2016 election,11 or alter voting procedures in light of
COVID-19,12 state and local governments need financial support. And
the support they are currently receiving is inadequate.13 Election
officials are, according to Michigan director of elections Christopher
Thomas, “at the bottom of the food chain when it comes to
resources.”14 This alone is disconcerting and justifies an auditing of
election spending.15
Given our lack of spending data, it is difficult to know which
reforms are sensible. For instance, data revealing intrastate spending
disparities might indicate that resources are being ineffectively
distributed. Ideally, within each state, all voters will receive roughly
the same level of voting-related services. Yet we know, anecdotally, that
counties, which generally run elections in the United States, differ
markedly in their election system performance. Relatedly, we simply do
not know how intercounty spending disparities relate to other
variables, like county size and county demographics. The absence of this
information further complicates reform prospects. For these reasons,
10. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION 10 (2014), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/
publication/466754/doc/slspublic/Amer%20Voting%20Exper-final%20draft%2001-04-14-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JP6V-SMM2] (“The most universal complaint of election administrators in
testimony before the Commission concerned a lack of resources.”).
11. See NAT’L INTEL. COUNCIL, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND I NTENTIONS IN RECENT
US ELECTIONS (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
94S2-BCHH] (detailing Russian interference).
12. Alexa Corse & Dustin Volz, States Explore More Vote-By-Mail Options to Cope with
Coronavirus, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-explore-more-vote-by-mail-optionsto-cope-with-coronavirus-11585306800 (last updated Mar. 27, 2020, 2:19 PM) [https://perma.cc/
RY4J-8SQD].
13. See CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, LIZ HOWARD, PAUL ROSENZWEIG, DAVID SALVO & RACHAEL
DEAN WILSON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., DEFUNDING ELECTIONS: FEDERAL FUNDING NEEDS FOR
STATE ELECTION SECURITY (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/
Report_Defending_Elections.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT6N-V849] (making the case for additional
federal grant funds based on a six-state analysis).
14. Pat Beall, Catharina Felke & Elizabeth Mulvey, As Trump and Biden Battle, Election
Officials Are Running Out of Time, Money for November, PBS (July 14, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/frontline/article/covid-voting-mail-in-ballots-election-officials-running-out-of-time-moneyfor-november/?sf125413278=1 [https://perma.cc/RH25-5Y3C].
15. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Measuring Election System Performance,
13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 449 (2010) (“For example, there exists no census of election
administration to collect reliable and comprehensive data, including (1) the number of elections
run each year, (2) the resources of election offices (staffing and budgets), (3) the backgrounds and
political orientations of election officers, and (4) the number of poll workers.”).
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based on a novel and painstakingly hand-coded dataset, this Article
provides much needed information on election expenditures from four
states: California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida. These states, given their
unique characteristics,16 provide a compelling sample set. 17
Unsurprisingly, we find that election expenditures vary
significantly both across and within states and that, in many
communities, spending is frugal. But our findings also reveal that much
of the variation is seemingly unconnected to poverty, race, and other
traditional explanations of electoral disadvantage. For instance, some
rich counties spend less on elections than their poor neighbors; some
large counties spend less than small counties. Election spending in
majority-minority communities seems largely indistinguishable from
spending in predominantly white communities. In short, basic
assumptions one might have about resource allocation are brought
into question.
To be sure, data on election expenditures can only tell us so
much, and many questions remain unanswered.18 What is the precise
relationship between election spending and election quality? Why do we
tend to see poorer election administration in big cities? Why, given what
we know about the inadequacy of election services in many minority
communities, are those inadequacies not revealed by data on election
spending? These are immensely important questions that exceed the
scope of what follows. But our findings, which are based on both public
documents and responses we received from county and subcounty
officials, nevertheless have important doctrinal and normative

16. Among other features, the states differ in size, demographic profile, governance structure,
and political orientation. See infra Section II.A.
17. We are aware of only one other team of researchers that is attempting to measure election
expenditures on as large a scale, though their findings remain unpublished. A group of social
scientists, based out of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and funded by the MIT
Election Data and Science Lab, are engaged in a nationwide data collection project that attempts
to gather information that is similar to ours. See Mohr et al., supra note 7. Our project, however,
differs in important ways. Simply stated, our project examines election expenditures in
combination with overall budget numbers (from the Census Annual Survey of State and Local
Government Finances) and with demographic data (from the American Community Survey). We
also include multi-tier overlapping government expenditures (through geographic matchups).
Moreover, given our legal training, our project evaluates how this fiscal data might inform election
law doctrines. Finally, our data is more recent, includes findings from different jurisdictions, and,
as detailed below, is collected in part by predictive machine learning. In short, this Article presents
novel empirical findings and draws important doctrinal implications unlikely to be
replicated elsewhere.
18. One such question is how to account for varying funding source origins. See Mohr et al.,
supra note 7, at 16 (“Some states may pay for election equipment, equipment maintenance, and
training. Cost accounting may be needed to standardize the costs of election administration so
that the expenditures that are being observed, most often at the local level, are apples to
apples comparisons.”).
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implications pertaining to each of these questions and provide a
foundation on which future research can build.
First, just the variation itself in election expenditures from place
to place should give us pause, even if it is easily explainable. Even in a
world without bad faith, political meddling, or questionable motives, it
is difficult to run elections well without sufficient financial backing.
Overworked, undertrained, poorly supported election staff are less
likely than their well-resourced counterparts to administer elections in
an optimally inclusive and secure manner. Perhaps more money, and
more equalizing money, can help fix many election law-related issues.
As such, we propose that states utilize funding-redistribution measures
to establish a minimal, or adequate, level of election services. A voter in
a poor part of the rural Texas Panhandle should receive the same
minimally acceptable level of election services as a rich voter in an
urban technology hub, even if certain differences are justified.
Second, our findings highlight the limitations of doctrinal
interventions and judicial remedies that are divorced from issues of
resource allocation. The animating impulse of many election law
doctrines is participation—the ability to participate in politics on equal
terms with others. The bulk of contemporary litigation is over voting
rights for individuals and groups that allege they are being unjustly
burdened in their ability to meaningfully take part in a fair political
process. Given this fact, it is odd that election expenditures are rarely
a central aspect of litigation. We discuss this discordance between
“doctrine and dollars” below.
The Article proceeds in five parts: Part I provides background on
election funding, including a discussion of election costs and what the
most common funding sources are. This Part also discusses election law
doctrines and how they do not directly consider election expenditures.
Part II outlines our data and methods. In addition to the reported
findings, the Article uses predictive machine learning to supplement
remaining gaps in the research. Part III includes our main findings.
Part IV responds to the findings and explores potential doctrines under
which election expenditures might be considered. Part V weighs the
pros and cons of several nondoctrinal proposals for election
administration reform.
I. THE PRICE OF ELECTIONS
Given the vast heterogeneity of government units across the
country, a degree of modesty is in order when making claims about the
price of elections. In some locations, elections are well-funded and occur
without incident. In others, as described in the Introduction, a single
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election can cause financial distress. At times, federal funding
supplements state and local expenditures, though such funding is
typically quite limited and sporadic.19 More commonly, state and local
governments are required to finance elections on their own. This Part
provides background on election funding, including what the most
common funding sources are. It also discusses election law doctrines
and how they do not directly consider election expenditures.
A. Election Costs
To call the American electoral system decentralized risks
understatement. State and local governments are in charge of
administering elections and, accordingly, have to pay for election
administration.20 Local governments, in particular, “manage voter
registration systems, vote tabulation systems, absentee ballots, vote
reports, and the precincts, polling stations, and legions of poll workers
necessary to carry out an election.”21 Some of the costs associated with
these responsibilities are minimal. For instance, reserving a local
gymnasium for use as a polling site is not a great expense. Similarly,
the costs associated with training local election officials is not likely to
be great. Constant experimentation also leads to cost savings. For
example, Los Angeles County replaced thousands of its polling sites

19. See, e.g., DELUZIO ET AL., supra note 13, at 1:
Critically, in 2018 Congress provided $380 million in Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
grant funds to help states bolster their election security. Grant recipient states had to
submit a grant narrative—a list of specific election security projects (and estimated
costs) that the state planned to fund with grant money—and provide a 5 percent state
match within two years;
Matthew M. Damschroder, Of Money, Machines, and Management: Election Administration from
an Administrator’s Perspective, 12 ELECTION L.J. 195, 195 (2013) (describing the “five main
outcomes” of the Help America Vote Act); Miles Parks, Congress Allocates $425 Million for Election
Security in New Legislation, NPR (Dec. 16, 2019, 5:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2019/12/16/788490509/congress-allocates-425-million-for-election-security-in-new-legislation
[https://perma.cc/XS43-PN2S] (“Although Congress has agreed to support elections infrastructure
around the nation, it does so in large, unpredictable chunks as opposed to predictable year-overyear appropriations — which many election officials would prefer.”). Four-hundred million dollars
in election security grants were included in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act, Covid-19 Stimulus Bill: What It Means for States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr.
2, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/coronavirus-stimulus-billstates.aspx [https://perma.cc/DZU4-KUHW], a sum that many believe to be woefully inadequate.
See, e.g., Martin Matishak, Think Tank Estimates $2 Billion Cost to Carry Out November Election
During Pandemic, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/19/2020election-cost-coronavirus-138232 [https://perma.cc/EMC2-W6ZR].
20. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 778 (2016)
(“The degree and kind of decentralization varies by state, but nearly all aspects of election
administration are delegated to local governments by at least some set of states.”).
21. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 15, at 448.
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with vote centers.22 The move was designed to provide greater
convenience by permitting voting at any vote center in the county over
an eleven-day period. Beyond simple convenience, though, vote centers
are also cost-effective.23 In short, whether through state appropriations
or local bond measures, certain costs are both predictable and bearable.
Other costs, though, are much more burdensome. Running a
primary election is often quite expensive.24 California’s 2012 decision to
hold only one, rather than two, primary elections reportedly “saved the
California state budget approximately $100 million.” 25 Technological
upgrades, including new voting machines and related security
measures, can also be remarkably costly.26 For example, Arizona
election officials claim that they “do not currently have funds they need
to expand cybersecurity assistance to local election officials or replace
legacy voting systems.”27 Colorado’s secretary of state has raised similar
concerns about the cost of cybersecurity protections.28 Even assuming
cybersecurity protections can be bought and installed, information
technology specialists are necessary to monitor system performance.29

22. Matt Stiles & Ryan Menezes, Now You Can Vote Anywhere in L.A. County. Find a
Location, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-county-vote-centerlocations [https://perma.cc/2GGD-SM6J]; Austin Cross, Enjoy Your Local Polling Place While You
Can. It Probably Won’t Last, LAIST (Oct. 30, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://laist.com/2018/10/30/
los_angeles_local_polling_place_voting_centers.php [https://perma.cc/MP9E-ENS6]; see also
David McClendon, Top 5 Takeaways About the Vote Your Way Campaign, JANUARYADVISORS (Dec.
20, 2019), https://www.januaryadvisors.com/vote-your-way-top-5-takeaways [https://perma.cc/
QE3B-L9J3] (reviewing a voting campaign from Harris County, Texas, that allowed voters to vote
at any polling location, not just the one assigned to their precinct).
23. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE PRICE OF DEMOCRACY: SPLITTING THE BILL
FOR ELECTIONS 25 (2018), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Final_Costs_
Report-Splitting_the_Bill_for_Elections_32084.pdf [https://perma.cc/A58Z-H8LX] (“Having vote
centers reduces a jurisdiction’s need for precinct polling places. Fewer polling places means fewer
poll workers are needed, as well as potentially fewer supplies and rental costs for polling place
locations, all of which can save a jurisdiction money.”).
24. See BARBARA NORRANDER, THE IMPERFECT PRIMARY: ODDITIES, BIASES, AND STRENGTHS
OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS 138 (3d ed. 2019) (“In several recent election years,
a handful of states canceled their presidential primaries in [the] face of state budget shortfalls.”).
25. Id. at 143.
26. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 23, at 2 (“While elections technology
costs are just one part of the overall costs of elections, they are the driving cost in policy
conversations, at least at the legislative level. That’s because most states are looking to replace
their equipment before the 2020 presidential election.”).
27. DELUZIO ET AL., supra note 13, at 4.
28. Michael Wines, $250 Million to Keep Votes Safe? Experts Say Billions Are Needed, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/us/mitch-mcconnell-election-security-bill-.html (last
updated Sept. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3H3F-EHM3].
29. See Damschroder, supra note 19, at 198 (“Ten years since the promise of an IT revolution
in election administration was kick-started by [the Help America Vote Act], election
administrators—and the local government officials who must now foot most of the bill to keep it
all going—are wondering whether the ongoing price tag is worth it.”).

2021]

DEMOCRACY ON A SHOESTRING

1087

This requires hiring election officials or specialists with the requisite
technological skills.
Outside of elections, funds are needed simply to maintain
registration databases. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”)30
requires states to maintain centralized voter registration databases.
Among other things, this requires coordinating with local
governments,31 providing a means of accepting and processing
registrations from individuals and organizations that register new
voters, and empowering state agencies to register new voters when
individuals utilize their services.32 These bureaucratic obligations are
not without cost.33 In sum, elections involve both fixed and variable
costs for which state and local governments must budget.
B. Who Pays?
So, where does the money come from? The National Conference
of State Legislatures (“NCSL”) reports that most costs are still borne by
counties and local governments, but, over time, states have increased
their financial support.34 Nearly all states, with the sole exception of
North Dakota, maintain statewide voter registration lists that are paid
for with state funds.35 States typically also pay for elections, though the
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145).
31. See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 23, at 17 (“[I]n Texas, 215 of
the 254 counties directly use the Texas statewide voter registration system to manage their data,
and another 39 counties manage their own voter registration data and exchange data with the
statewide database every night.”); Justin Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, 85 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1102 (2018) (“Because California’s elections system is highly decentralized—
voter registration happens at the local level—and because local public assistance and DMV offices
collect the voter registration forms, those local agencies must coordinate with local registrars’
offices to deliver the forms.”).
32. The latter is an obligation required by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. See
52 U.S.C. § 20504 (requiring motor vehicle offices to register voters); 52 U.S.C. § 20506 (requiring
public assistance offices and disability services offices to register voters).
33. See Mohr et al., supra note 7, at 25:
The cost of an election is simply the cost of the personnel, equipment, and supplies
needed to conduct an election during the relatively brief period of time when people are
voting. The cost of elections is the cost of all election administration that includes the
cost of the election and the additional costs of maintaining and securing the voter
registration database, updating it with DMV and military records, updating, testing,
and securing the voting equipment, and training election officials throughout the year.
In sum, the cost of elections is greater than the cost of an election.
(emphasis added).
34. See Election Costs: What States Pay, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-costs.aspx#SVRS
[https://perma.cc/DXL4-RC9C] (“A series of federal laws in the last 50 years have had the impact
of putting more of the responsibility (and therefore the cost) of elections on states, rather than
local jurisdictions.”).
35. Id.
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details of how much and for which types of elections vary greatly. For
example, in Delaware, the state Department of Elections pays for all
elections in the state.36 In Alabama, the state covers the entire cost of
elections involving only federal or state candidates, but only half the
cost of elections involving federal, state, and county races.37 In
Michigan, local governments may seek reimbursement for the cost of
running a presidential primary.38
State financial support primarily comes from state tax
revenues.39 Counties—whose budgets are typically comprised of federal
money, state money, and local property taxes—use their general funds
to administer elections. Local governments, school districts, and special
purpose districts also use their general funds to pay for elections and in
some instances will reimburse counties for the inclusion of local issues
on a county-produced ballot.40
The least consistent form of funding comes from the federal
government. Such funding is infrequent and spotty. In 2019, the
Congressional Research Service reported that “Congress has authorized
significant federal funding for state and local election administration in
one bill: HAVA.”41 HAVA initially provided the means for states to
upgrade their voting systems. 42 It has since been used to improve
election security, with Congress allocating $380 million to that end in
early 2018 and an additional $425 million in late 2019. 43 More recently,
Congress included $400 million in election funding in the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, passed in March 2020.44 These
are paltry amounts given acknowledged financial needs. 45

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Hubler & Underhill, supra note 7 (“For states that do help with election funding, the
money can come from a direct appropriation. In cases where policy choices increase costs for local
jurisdictions, such as implementing early voting or enhanced post-election audit procedures, states
may fund the new mandate.”).
40. See, e.g., CAROLYN CHU & NICK SCHROEDER, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., THE 2017-18
BUDGET: CONSIDERING THE STATE’S ROLE IN ELECTIONS 3 (2017), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/
3634/state-role-elections-033017.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9CQ-TERK].
41. KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45549, THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES 9 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R45549.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSJ2-5LTM].
42. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 20, at 757–59.
43. Parks, supra note 19.
44. Emily Cochrane & Nicholas Fandos, Senate Approves $2 Trillion Stimulus After
Bipartisan Deal, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/politics/coronavirus-senatedeal.html (last updated May 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JR44-C3QK].
45. See generally DELUZIO ET AL., supra note 13 (finding that current federal funding for
elections is insufficient).
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C. Doctrine and Dollars
Does legal doctrine account for resource disparities? The short
answer is no. Voters who feel they have been unjustly excluded or
disadvantaged have several legal theories under which they might seek
recourse. The most common statutory cause of action is the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”),46 which prohibits both vote denial47 and vote
dilution48 on account of race or color. Though the doctrine remains
confused, voters might pursue a cause of action under the First
Amendment.49 Intentional racial discrimination, though difficult to
establish, can be challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 And
the framework most commonly applied to election regulations, a form
of judicial review unique to election law commonly known as AndersonBurdick,51 balances burdens on voters against state interests, also
under the Fourteenth Amendment.52 None of these legal theories
provides an ideal fit for challenging resource disparities.
The VRA is aimed at remedying racial discrimination in the
political process. First Amendment theories of the right to vote turn on
contested notions about the parameters of speech and association.53 The
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on intentional racial
discrimination is, barring a damning evidentiary record, inapposite.

46. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (prohibiting states from applying any “standard, practice, or
procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color”).
47. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1011 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(“The results test of Section 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] applies in both vote dilution and vote
denial cases.”); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th Cir.
2014) (“Indeed, Section 2’s plain language makes clear that vote denial is precisely the kind of
issue Section 2 was intended to address.”).
48. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (analyzing a vote dilution claim under the VRA).
49. See Joshua S. Sellers, Political Participation, Expressive Association, and Judicial
Review, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 1617, 1624–28 (2020); Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is
Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 472 (2016) (“The First Amendment is a logical locus for
voting protection for several reasons.”).
50. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1985) (“Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
492 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)); see also Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L.
REV. 1211, 1212, 1220 (2018).
51. The shorthand refers to two Supreme Court cases addressing regulations of the electoral
process. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
52. See Sellers, supra note 49, at 1624–28 (explaining Anderson-Burdick).
53. Id. at 1628–35.
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And Anderson-Burdick, while potentially applicable, has in practice
provided substantial deference to states.54
Perhaps this is perfectly tolerable. Perhaps the last thing we
want is courts second-guessing state and local governments’ spending
choices. Moreover, disparate resource allocation may in many instances
be good public policy. There are compelling reasons not to unthinkingly
equalize election expenditures across all counties: counties vary in size,
population, and need.55 Further, nothing mandates that elections be
generously funded. Above a relatively low threshold level of access, one
could argue, voters have little legal basis to challenge antiquated or
even inconvenient voting procedures.
Under this way of thinking, judicial review is appropriately
limited to circumstances in which the right to vote is severely impeded,
or in which certain classes of voters are systematically disadvantaged.
In general, however, election services may very well be poor. Just as we
lack an affirmative right to vote,56 we lack an affirmative right to a
smoothly run, convenient election system. On the other hand, it is
reasonable to suspect that election administration problems are related
to funding. Again, election administrators themselves cite a lack of
funding as their principal concern. The question remains: Are there
any doctrinal grounds on which disparate election expenditures might
be challenged?
One underdeveloped doctrinal possibility derives from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore,57 in which the Court ended
the recounting of contested ballots in Florida, effectively awarding the
presidency to George W. Bush. 58 For all the controversy over the
decision, the equal protection holding held promise for voting rights
advocates.59 In reinforcing the principle that franchise equality extends
54. Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 554
(2015); Ellen D. Katz, Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreat from Election Law, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1615, 1631 (2009).
55. Richard L. Hasen, When Is Uniformity of People, Not Counties, Appropriate in Election
Administration? The Cases of Early and Sunday Voting, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 198; David C.
Kimball & Brady Baybeck, Are All Jurisdictions Equal? Size Disparity in Election Administration,
12 ELECTION L.J. 130, 142 (2013) (“Densely populated local jurisdictions are substantially different
than smaller jurisdictions in many measurable indicators of election administration.”).
56. See Jesse Wegman, Why Voting Discrimination Haunts America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/opinion/15th-amendment-voting-anniversary.html
[https://perma.cc/6FET-W4B4].
57. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
58. For a full accounting of the case, see Edward B. Foley, Bush v. Gore: The Court Stops the
Recount, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 541 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
59. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007)
(“[T]he opinion could usher in an era when courts would use the equal protection clause as a tool
to fix some fundamental inequalities in the ‘nuts and bolts’ of our country’s hyper-decentralized
election administration system.”).
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to the “manner”60 of voting, and in assailing “arbitrary and disparate
treatment”61 by the state, the Court indicated support for general
fairness in the realm of election administration.62 In fact, the Court
specifically relied on an earlier decision in which it invalidated
“arbitrary and disparate treatment to voters in its different counties.”63
To be sure, Bush v. Gore also includes language that cuts against
a broad equal protection holding.64 And scholars continue to debate its
relevance.65 But one judicial circuit has relied on the decision to
invalidate not just intercounty disparities, but a number of laws
involving the arbitrary treatment of voters.66 A workable litigation
theory, then, would depend on tethering such arbitrary treatment of
voters to identifiable resource disparities. We consider the practicality
of such a theory in Section IV.A.
A second doctrinal possibility for challenging disparate election
expenditures, one premised on the notion of electoral adequacy, might
exist under judicial interpretations of state constitutions. As Josh
Douglas has noted, “all fifty states provide explicit voting protection for
their citizens.”67 Further, twenty-six states include language in their
constitutions ensuring some form of “free” elections.68 And finally,
Anderson-Burdick provides a third doctrinal basis on which inadequate
election resources might be challenged. We consider these possibilities
in Sections IV.B and IV.C. But first, we turn to a discussion of our data,
methods, and main findings.

60. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
61. Id.
62. See Samuel Issacharoff, Opinion, The Court in the Crossfire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/opinion/the-court-in-the-crossfire.html
[https://perma.cc/D34J-RN4B] (“[The Court] has asserted a new constitutional requirement: to
avoid disparate and unfair treatment of voters.”).
63. Bush, 531 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added) (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)).
64. Id. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
65. Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L.J. 451, 483 (2019) (“Courts have
occasionally invoked the equal protection claim in Bush v. Gore when considering election lawrelated litigation. I hesitate even to raise Bush v. Gore.”); Hasen, supra note 55, at 193 (“Almost a
decade and a half since the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Bush v. Gore, no one knows
what the case’s Equal Protection principle means or if it exists at all.”).
66. See generally Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the
Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865 (2013) (summarizing the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on and expansion of Bush v. Gore).
67. Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89,
101 (2014).
68. Id. at 103 (“As an added level of protection, twenty-six states include a provision in their
constitutions stating that elections shall be ‘free,’ ‘free and equal,’ or ‘free and open.’ ”).
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II. DATA AND METHODS
As a country, we have a shamefully inadequate amount of
information about how our elections are paid for. Anecdotes, while
interesting, present a complex picture that simply reinforces the need
for data. For example, as noted above, Los Angeles County has
sufficient resources to open additional voting centers and develop a new
generation of voting machines. But not all local governments are as
fortunate. A lack of resources potentially affects the quality of
operations. Consider the hiring of election staffers. The New York Times
describes the recruitment of poll workers in New York City as “a
perennial problem,”69 yet efforts to increase poll worker pay above
fourteen dollars an hour have failed.70 Elections administrators in
Missoula County, Montana, are paid just $8.65 an hour, less than they
would be paid down the road at the local Walmart.71 Alas, for job
applicants, “enthusiasm for democracy is a must!”72
These examples suggest variation in how much money
communities spend on election administration. But is such variation
rare or the norm? To move beyond anecdotes, we collected data on the
election-related expenditures of multiple tiers of government. Our aim
was to approximate, as much as possible, how much money is spent in
different parts of the country. Because so little of this research exists,
our focus was on overall funding patterns rather than granularity. This
Part outlines our data and methods.
A. Local Government Budgets
Since multiple tiers of government have a hand in funding
elections, we collected budget data on multiple tiers and combined
69. Spenser Mestel, The Path to Becoming an Underpaid, Underappreciated and Absolutely
Necessary Election Poll Worker, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/
nyregion/the-path-to-becoming-an-underpaid-underappreciated-and-absolutely-necessaryelection-poll-worker.html [https://perma.cc/74TP-35RE].
70. Id.:
Every year for the past eight years, the Board of Elections has asked the State Assembly
to increase compensation for poll workers – this year by paying poll workers $100 for
the four-hour training and $300 for the roughly 17 hours of work on Election Day. The
proposal has never passed.
71. Peter Christian, Missoula County Looks to Hire 600 Election Judges for 2020, NEWSTALK
KGVO (Jan. 21, 2020), https://newstalkkgvo.com/missoula-county-looks-to-hire-600-electionjudges-for-2020 [https://perma.cc/SSP7-5QYQ] (“$8.65 is our basic wage for most entry
level positions.”).
72. Election
Judge
Qualifications
&
Duties,
MISSOULA
CNTY.,
MONT.,
https://www.missoulacounty.us/government/administration/elections-office/election-judgeinformation/election-judge-qualifications-duties (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
7EM7-EQ49].
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them. The data is from four states: California, Arizona, Texas, and
Florida. These states are in no way a random or representative sample
of the United States as a whole. They are, however, commonly thought
to reflect different political realities, represent different approaches to
governance, have varied histories, and exhibit geographical diversity.
These four states also capture a sizable share of the national population
(almost a third). And these four states are frequently in the headlines
for election-related affairs. As such, we hope to make claims about these
four states specifically and, with caution, speculate about the likely
conditions elsewhere.
Crucial to all subsequent claims is the observation that even in
just these four states, different tiers of government have varied revenue
structures, expenses, and governing responsibilities. A county or
county-equivalent in one part of the country cannot necessarily be
equated with a county elsewhere just because they share the same
designation. States have great leeway under the U.S. Constitution to
structure their relationships with substate governing entities.73
Therefore, we must be careful about making simplistic comparisons
between states.
Our analysis is strongest when we compare similar governing
entities with neighbors that share similar tasks. Noting that Los
Angeles spends more (or less) on elections than Houston is less
informative than comparing counties and cities within the greater Los
Angeles or Houston metropolitan areas. This is also the reason why our
data collection was not a random sample of, say, counties in the United
States. Since different counties across the United States handle
different kinds and volumes of elections, comparisons within a
random sample of counties would likely be misleading or present an
incomplete picture.74
Our data collection strategy began by utilizing the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Census of Governments to identify counties, countyequivalents, cities, towns, townships, and villages that might have a
hand in funding and running elections.75 The Census of Governments
is administered every five years (in years ending in “2” and “7”). The
survey is thorough and yields very high response rates from close to
73. See Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local
Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1371–74 (2020) (discussing states’ ability to substantively and
structurally preempt local governing entities).
74. We considered collecting data on the number of local elections administered or even the
number of votes cast, but we simply lack the resources to do this additional data collection. We
hope future researchers will iterate on our work, perhaps by creating a compelling index measure
of local election activity.
75. Census of Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/
go0100.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/Z5VW-6MWP].
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ninety thousand local government entities, certainly far beyond what
we could have accomplished.76 The end result, for our purposes, is an
up-to-date list of the hundreds of county and municipal governments in
these states.77
We then utilize this list to research election-related
expenditures one government entity at a time. At times, this was as
simple as navigating to, say, a town’s official website and downloading
PDFs of previous budgets. At other times, we had to email or call local
government officials to obtain budgets that were otherwise unavailable.
Again, sometimes this process was simple and quick; sometimes it
required significant time and patience.78
Once we obtained the budgets, we had to extract the relevant
information on election administration expenses. The budgets varied
tremendously in length, style, digital format, and organization.79 Some
government entities grouped all their election administration expenses
together in one clearly labeled place. Others distributed these expenses
across multiple entries, often hundreds of pages apart, that we then
added together (e.g., equipment costs in one part of the budget, and
salaries in another, or voter registration expenses separated from
operational costs). Because of this variance, we want to stress that the
data is fuzzy.
For example, while some budgets list expenditures in great
detail, down to the last stamp put on a letter, others are vaguer,
providing only a broad overview of election administration
expenditures. In some counties there is a shared pool of office stationery
that election administrators use but that does not appear in their
individual budget. In other places, such expenses are separately listed.
This variance creates room for interpretation. All our findings must be
read with this cautionary note in mind.80 But election work is
76. Id. We are mindful of the possibility of new local governments being chartered during the
timespan that we studied, or of local governments dissolving or merging. Neither event, however,
is common in the four states that we studied and, in general, occurs with local government units
that are not populous.
77. The Census Bureau also conducts an Annual Survey of Governments that includes
tremendously useful information on government finances. That survey, however, is unfortunately
not granular enough for election-related activities. See Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police
Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277, 288–89 (2020) (discussing the Annual Survey of Governments, its
methodology, and the data it collects).
78. Many thanks, again, to our wonderful research assistants who dedicated themselves to
this task with uncommon diligence. Many thanks also to the numerous local government officials
who generously helped us.
79. This variation ruled out, for our purposes, automated web scrapping, parsing, and the
like. Some of the budgets are not machine readable. Not even the search function works on
these documents.
80. In a few instances this made data collection impossible. For example, in the City of
Wichita Falls, Texas, the city clerk is responsible for a variety of tasks, including maintaining legal
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sufficiently important and distinct such that it is often treated as a
separate and clearly labelled budget line item. This gives us confidence
that the core of what we capture in the budgets is stable across
jurisdictions. Again, this argument is strongest when comparing
neighbors in the same state and weakest when comparing across states.
Having collected election administration expenses from one
jurisdiction for one year, we then repeated this process for multiple
years for each government entity. Collecting data on only one year
would have greatly sped up the process and allowed for a broader
geographic scope. But we believe multiyear collection was necessary to
account for uneven expenditures across years. A town or county might
report unrepresentatively high election administration expenditures in
one year for idiosyncratic reasons. Perhaps there was an unusual string
of special elections that year, or perhaps the county election
administration building burned down and needed to be replaced.81 Such
possibilities are very difficult to observe and include as control
variables, thus, collecting data on a single year might have
problematically skewed the analysis. Idiosyncratic events happen,
though, and must be acknowledged. Our approach takes this reality
into account by utilizing the mean inflation-adjusted election
administration expenditures in each jurisdiction across seven years,
ending in 2017 (we started collecting data in 2018).82
An additional reason to collect budget expenditures from
multiple years is that budget years are not uniform. Some local
governments close their budgets in May and some in October.
Consequently, it becomes difficult to compare expenditures in a single
budget year. For example, a “2016” budget that closes in October of 2016
might contain significant expenditures related to the presidential
election that year, but no expenditures of the election itself. It would be
difficult to meaningfully compare such a budget with one that closes
one month later (even closer to the election) or two months later (right
after the election). As such, a multiyear approach also helps ensure that
files on all contracts, “maintaining ownership records on all City cemeteries,” and “managing and
conducting all City elections.” The budget contains information on the city clerk’s office but does
not separate out with sufficient clarity all election expenditures. Annual Operating Budget for
Fiscal Year 2017-18, CITY OF WICHITA FALLS, TEX. 403–06 (Oct. 1, 2017),
http://www.wichitafallstx.gov/DocumentCenter/View/30021/Final-Adopted-Budget-2017-2018
[https://perma.cc/LX8T-59KS].
81. Similarly, expensive voting equipment purchases are sometimes concentrated in one year
and sometimes spread out over multiple years.
82. The reality is that for some jurisdictions we have data for seven years, but for others we
have data for fewer years. Some counties make only the last few years of budgets readily available.
Also, whenever possible we collected data on actual expenditures rather than budgeted
expenditures. Often these two numbers are closely aligned, but some government entities
systematically overbudget.
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variation in budget closing dates does not overshadow what we are
trying to measure.
For these reasons, we flatten the time-series data we collected
for these jurisdictions into a single inflation-adjusted mean.83 This
approach implies that we, in a way, lose a tremendous amount of
information: we report only one data point per government unit rather
than seven. We thought this was necessary, however, to make that one
data point strong and reliable. Our time span allows us to smooth
expenditures across time and present a better measure of “typical”
expenditures. Of course, data on more years would always be better, but
we believe seven years of data represents a reasonable compromise
between feasibility and accuracy. The seven-year time span includes
multiple types of elections (local, state, congressional, and presidential)
as well as various forms of direct democracy like referendums,
initiatives, and recalls.
B. Composite Estimates of Election Expenditures
Next, we bifurcated our analysis. For some of the figures in the
following sections we focus on single government entities (e.g.,
counties). In those figures, we simply report the budget numbers we
collected. By contrast, in other parts of the analysis we seek to provide
a sense of how much money multiple government entities are spending
on election administration in a specific location. As such, some of the
analysis below utilizes composite estimates of election administration
expenditures. Many voters are almost certainly oblivious to the
distinction. Most voters do not know, and many perhaps do not care,
who pays for the election services that they receive.84 But they are
keenly aware when operations are well run and when they are not. For
instance, a voter in a town might receive election services from that
town, the county, the state, and, to a much smaller degree, the federal
government. And the voting experience might be affected by which
entity is footing the bill. To account for this, we aggregated and
disaggregated the election administration expenditure means from the
previous step of the analysis into small geographic units.

83. While we adjusted for inflation (which was relatively low during the observed timespan),
we did not adjust for cost of living. Other researchers might want to incorporate such a measure.
We did not do so here because significant election expenditures are invariable (e.g., voting
equipment costing the same, whether purchased by a county with a low or high cost of living).
84. As noted, many policymakers are similarly uninformed. Martha Kropf & JoEllen V. Pope,
Election Costs: A Study of North Carolina, in THE FUTURE OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 185, 185
(Mitchell Brown, Kathleen Hale & Bridgett A. King eds., 2020) (noting that the amount that state
and local governments spend on elections “remains a mystery to scholars and policymakers”).
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The unit of analysis that we chose was U.S. census tracts
(“tracts” or “census tracts”). We chose tracts because they are fairly
small, reasonably permanent,85 and often socially meaningful
statistical subgroups of a county.86 Tract populations typically range
from slightly above a thousand individuals to eight thousand
individuals, but most contain around four thousand individuals.87 Each
county contains at least one census tract. We used geometric
intersection algorithms to proportionally disaggregate county election
administration expenditures according to the population of the
constitutive census tracts in each county.88 For towns, townships,
villages, and cities, we aggregated expenditures if subcounty
governments were smaller than census tracts and disaggregated if they
contained multiple census tracts.
We then created per capita expenditure measures for
government units and census tracts.89 We combined these measures
with demographic and economic data from the American Community
Survey (“ACS”). The ACS is continuously administered by the U.S.
Census Bureau. Every year, more than three million households across
the United States receive ACS forms.90 The responses present an

85. Census tracts are typically adjusted for the decennial census that is administered in years
ending in “0.” Since our data collection does not span across multiple decennial censuses, the tracts
remained largely the same (the Census Bureau at times allows for small boundary adjustments
between decennial censuses, but this had likely little or no effect on our findings in this Article).
86. Census tracts are comprised of block groups that are, in turn, comprised of blocks.
Because our data is not sufficiently granular, we decided not to use block groups or blocks as our
primary unit of analysis. Conversely, the census also tracks other geographies that might be of
interest to other researchers, most notably federal congressional districts. But because our work
here focuses on all election administration work, not only work related to federal elections, we
utilize a more granular unit of analysis. Also, federal congressional district boundaries do not
necessarily correspond to local government boundaries. See generally Glossary, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/glossary (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9WTYNG6R] (user can manually search for census terms).
87. United States Census Information @ Pitt: Understanding Census Geography, UNIV. OF
PITTSBURGH LIBR. SYS., https://pitt.libguides.com/uscensus/understandinggeography#:~:text=
Census%20tracts%20generally%20contain%20between,follow%20relatively%20permanent%20vi
sible%20features (last updated Aug. 28, 2020, 12:33 PM) [https://perma.cc/J3RG-MZU4]. The
Census Bureau combines tracts when one of them gets close to the one thousand population mark.
Conversely, it splits tracts when they get close to eight thousand. See id. (“Census tracts generally
contain between 1,000 and 8,000 people with an optimum size of 4,000 people.”).
88. To do this, we matched our data and census data with geographic data that identified the
physical shape of each census tract, county, and municipality. Each of these units can be
represented as a polygon on a given projection of the globe. Once we treat these units as polygons,
we can then check for overlapping polygonal geometries (contain, equals, disjoint, within, touch,
covers, etc.).
89. Keeping in mind that populations changed over the timespan we studied.
90. The Importance of the American Community Survey and the 2020 Census, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about/acs-and-census.html (last updated
Oct. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/S3H7-8GXS]. A sample form can be found online. See 2020 ACS
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points in the analysis below. Many figures will present findings based
on collected data alone, while other present both combined and inferred
data. Cautious and skeptical readers should disregard the
supplemented data and focus only on findings based on collected data.
We tested the supplementation of our hand-collected data using
a variety of supervised machine learning approaches.93 We explored knearest neighbors classification algorithms, random forests models,
regression models, and deep learning networks. For each model, we
trained our algorithm with input examples from our hand-coded
dataset that indicate the desired output (mean annual inflationadjusted per capita election administration expenditures). We then
evaluated which approach yielded the most reliable responses, given
the structure of our data.
We found that multiple models performed nearly identically.
Some were more accurate in one state but lagged a bit in others. Some
performed marginally better for counties than municipalities. In the
end, we decided to stack the four highest-performing models to derive
robust and resilient estimates. We utilize the stacked predicted
values of these models in all our subsequent figures that include
inferred estimates.
D. Limitations and Strengths
We want to emphasize some of the limitations of our approach.
The first is that it only yields an estimate, one embedded with
numerous assumptions.94 The second important limitation is that we
collected substate data only from counties, cities, towns, townships, and
villages, but did not collect data on special purpose districts. Insofar as
such districts independently raise revenue that is then spent on election
administration tasks, this could skew our analysis. We
impressionistically found that many special districts, to the extent they
perform
election
administrative
tasks,
do
so
through
intragovernmental payments either to or from other substate
government units.
Despite these limitations, our hand-coding of hundreds of
budgets, coupled with the predictive machine learning, creates our best
estimate of local election administration expenditures.95 To our
93. To account for local variation, we repeated this process for each state and kept all training
model and prediction data separate. In other words, predictions for, say, a town in Texas derive
solely from observed data from Texas rather than any other state.
94. We would be thrilled if future researchers improved and iterated on our approach.
95. To be more precise: this approach creates our best estimate of the aggregate mean annual
local per capita election administration expenses that multiple units deploy in a given place.
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knowledge, this methodology has never been used in this context. The
strength of this approach is that it allows us to make novel geographic
comparisons that inform crucial policy and doctrinal debates.
III. MAIN FINDINGS
The previous Part explained how we collected and analyzed data
from hundreds of county and subcounty government units that have a
hand in funding and running elections. This Part includes our main
findings. We stress three points.
First, geographic comparison in the four states we studied
reveals massive variation between and within states in the funding of
election services. The multiple and overlapping government layers in
one part of a state might have many multiple times the resources of
those in other parts of a state. Insofar as spending is associated with
quality, a person in one part of, say Texas or California, might receive
far more and better election services than in another part of the state.
Funding levels, as previously noted, are not necessarily commensurate
with the quality of election services, but of course we cannot begin to
explore a relationship between the two without knowing how much is
being spent.
Second, we were unable to establish a clear connection between
funding variation and variables like race, poverty, and education levels.
This is perhaps our most striking finding. We expected variation in
funding to be strongly related to known sources of electoral
disadvantage. Instead, we find odd local idiosyncrasies to be the
dominant feature. This complicates the conventional narrative in which
election officials systematically underinvest in poor or minority
communities. To be clear, such underinvestment exists in an
unfortunate number of instances and, in many instances seems
intentional. But our data suggests that the simplest version of the
conventional narrative—that disadvantaged communities are always
forced to operate with fewer resources than their peer communities—is
perhaps oversimplified.
Third, we find surprisingly low spending levels. While there are
some outlier local governments that invest heavily in election
administration, most spend very little (typically around $4.50–$8.50
annual per capita).96

96. These findings generally align with the preliminary results reported by the UNCCharlotte research team. See Mohr et al., supra note 7, at 22–23.
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A. Geographic Variation
We begin with a geographic representation of our data, first
focusing on municipalities, then on counties, and then tracts. The
advantage of a geographic approach is that it locates data in real space.
This allows us to represent a mountain of difficult data in a condensed
format that permits readers to explore and test their intuitions.97
Figure 1 focuses on the election expenditures of municipalities in
California. The Census Bureau identifies more than a thousand cities,
towns, villages, townships, and other municipalities that might have a
hand in funding and running elections. They range from Los Angeles
with a population of around four million to small towns with a few
hundred residents.98 To make their average election expenditures
comparable, we represent in Figure 1 per capita expenditures in
different colors:99 The deeper the brown, the more local spending levels
are below the state median; the stronger the green, the more local
spending is above the state median. Grey indicates expenditures
around the state median.100 Figure 1 includes both observed and
inferred data. (Appendix 1 provides the same figure with only
observed data.)

97. See Roger Michalski, MDL Immunity: Lessons from the National Prescription Opiate
Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175, 196 (2019) (“Geography is information-rich, multifaceted,
and underutilized.”).
98. Geographic size is, of course, not synonymous with importance and often has little
relationship to population size.
99. A note to readers: In order to observe the color coding in the figures that follow, please
access the online version of this Article on the Vanderbilt Law Review’s website,
https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org.
100. Each quarter standard deviation from the state mean results in a deepening hue.
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FIGURE 1: OBSERVED AND INFERRED PER CAPITA
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN CALIFORNIA

Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median; stronger
greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a band surrounding
the state median.

Figure 1 illustrates the great number of municipalities
in California and their geographic disbursal. While big coastal
cities and Sacramento are easy to identify, Figure 1 also shows the
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many municipalities in the Central Valley along Highway 99 and
Northern California.
The biggest lesson of Figure 1 is the great range of local election
expenditures. Many municipalities spend less than a dollar per person
per year on election expenditures, while others spend many multiples
more. While the median is low, the distribution is also noticeable. Most
municipalities spend at or below the statewide median on election
expenditures. Yet, the relatively few municipalities that spend more,
spend far above the average.
The next lesson of Figure 1 is the lack of a predictable pattern.
High election expenditure jurisdictions are distributed throughout the
state, many in places that might be hard to predict. Conversely,
numerous well-known and wealthy municipalities fall on the lower end
of the expenditure spectrum. There simply is no clear pattern to the
variation (say, a costal versus interior divide that might be suggested
by political differences). Instead, we observed a sprinkled pattern where
similarly situated neighbors are multiple standard deviations apart on
election expenditures.
These lessons hold true in the other three states where we
collected data.
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FIGURE 2: OBSERVED AND INFERRED PER CAPITA
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN TEXAS

Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a band
surrounding the state median.

Figure 2 shows the geographic dispersal of municipalities in
Texas, including a string of towns along the I-20 and I-35 corridors.
Election expenditures, once again color coded by standard deviations
away from the state median, vary drastically throughout the state. But
they also vary within distinct parts of the state. For example, the
Dallas-Fort Worth greater metropolitan area includes many cities and
towns. Some have below average expenditures, while some neighboring
towns are well above average. We will explore this variation in greater
detail in the next Section. For now, we merely seek to demonstrate the
geographic variation in election expenditures that, as Figure 3 shows,
also holds true in Arizona and Florida.
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FIGURE 3: OBSERVED AND INFERRED PER CAPITA
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN ARIZONA AND FLORIDA

Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a band surrounding
the state median.
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The previous figures showed municipal election expenditures.
Perhaps, one might imagine, municipalities differ in how much they
spend on elections, but counties do not (or differ less). Perhaps in many
places, municipalities vary more than counties, given counties’
governing responsibilities. To explore this possibility, Figure 4
geographically represents the election expenditures of different
counties. The Figure includes inferred county-level data for Texas.
FIGURE 4: OBSERVED AND INFERRED
PER CAPITA COUNTY EXPENDITURES

Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a
band surrounding the state median.

Figure 4 again displays a great deal of data. Like the municipal
figures, this Figure does not show geographic patterns along the lines
that we expected. Instead, we observe a colorful patchwork of altering
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election expenditures. Driving across one of these states, one could
continuously toggle back and forth between counties that spend
significantly below and above the state average.
Perhaps this finding is due to a myopic misunderstanding of
election expenditures. In many places, municipalities and counties
work in concert to organize, run, and fund elections. For instance, it
could be that one locale focuses its election activities at the county level,
thereby minimizing the role that municipalities play. Alternatively,
another locale might channel election expenditures primarily through
cities and towns, while relegating the county government to a more
modest role. If true, these two locales might have identical or similar
election expenditures, rendering the previous figures misleading.
To explore this possibility, Figure 5 aggregates and
disaggregates county and municipal government election expenditures
according to census tracts.101 We again begin with California.
FIGURE 5: OBSERVED AND INFERRED PER CAPITA
CENSUS TRACT EXPENDITURES IN CALIFORNIA

Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a
band surrounding the state median.
101. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
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Figure 5 provides a sense of how county and subcounty election
expenditures interact in California. As a general matter, this Figure
closely tracks the California county-only expenditures provided in
Figure 4. The reason is simple: in most areas of California, county
election expenditures dwarf subcounty expenditures (typically eight to
one). Therefore, the impact of municipal expenditures is often modest.
That is, municipal expenditures are rarely high enough to overcome the
significant variation in county-to-county expenditures observed in
Figure 4.
Nevertheless, while limited, municipal expenditures still
contribute to overall state heterogeneity by creating subcounty
variation. Two voters within the same county might be differently
situated because one receives election services only from the county
while the other receives services from both the county and their town.
For example, while Fresno County spends below the state average, the
City of Fresno’s significantly above-average election expenditures bring
the overall expenditures close to the state average. There are also
examples of compounding effects, where low county expenditures are
deepened by low city expenditures and, conversely, where a voter
receives the benefit of both high city and county expenditures.
Sometimes both effects occur side by side.
Similar patterns to those observed in California hold true in
Florida, Texas, and Arizona. While these are only four states, we
speculate that other states are no different. Perhaps this is because
states typically do not have overarching, statewide mechanisms to
detect unequal election expenditures, let alone counteract
them. Without more information and a normalizing mechanism, it
is not surprising that there is massive geographic variation in
election expenditures.
B. Null Findings
The geographic variation observed above demands further
inquiry. What drives these different spending patterns? We are not
aware of any deep theoretical accounts describing the variables that
affect local election administration spending decisions. Therefore, we
have little guidance to inform the construction of a causal model. That
said, our findings suggest a complex and unexpected relationship
between election expenditures and voter disadvantage. Countless
reports, studies, and news pieces reveal various forms of voter
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suppression, particularly within minority communities.102 Yet,
surprisingly, judged only by the amount of money spent, one would not
anticipate a greater number of voting-related problems in these
communities. We discuss our general findings before considering
possible explanations for this specific incongruity between our findings
and common expectations.
We begin our account with a simple scatterplot103 that shows the
relationship between election expenditures in various California
municipalities and the percentage of the municipality that is defined as
nonwhite by the Census Bureau.104 Municipalities on the left-hand side
are more homogenously white, while municipalities towards the right
are less so. Observations toward the bottom indicate low-expenditure
jurisdictions while observations higher up have higher expenditure
levels. Figure 6 includes predicted and observed data. Observed values
are marked by a dark border while predicted data lacks such borders.
(Appendix 2 provides the same graph with only observed data.)

102. E.g., Theodore R. Johnson, The New Voter Suppression, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan.
16,
2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voter-suppression
[https://perma.cc/A7VP-CR2L]; Michael Wines, Voting Rights Advocates Used to Have an Ally in
the Government. That’s Changing., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/12/us/voting-rights-voter-id-suppression.html [https://perma.cc/X4CZ-5Y8Z].
103. Michael Friendly & Daniel Denis, The Early Origins and Development of the Scatterplot,
41 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCIS. 103, 103 (2005) (“[W]e define a scatterplot as a plot of two variables, x and
y, measured independently to produce bivariate pairs (xi, yi), and displayed as individual points on
a coordinate grid typically defined by horizontal and vertical axes, where there is no necessary
functional relation between x and y.”).
104. We recognize, of course, that the census categories are only crude proxies.
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FIGURE 6: SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION EXPENDITURES TO
NON-WHITE POPULATION FOR MUNICIPALITIES IN CALIFORNIA

Notes: Municipalities are sized by population. Includes inferred observations
(highlighted by black borders). Extreme outliers not shown in the Figure.

The black trend line (with gray ninety-five percent confidence
intervals) indicates the correlation between election expenditures and
demographic diversity. It is almost entirely flat. While there is, of
course, variation between different municipalities, that variation is not
related in an obvious manner to demographic diversity. Figure 7 shows
the same information for Texas. (Appendix 3 provides the same graph
with only observed data.)
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FIGURE 7: SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION EXPENDITURES TO
NON-WHITE POPULATION FOR MUNICIPALITIES IN TEXAS

Notes: Municipalities are sized by population. Includes inferred observations
(highlighted by black borders). Extreme outliers not shown in the Figure.

Once again, we observe a mostly flat trend line. The same holds
true in Arizona and Florida. Other traditional variables similarly fail
to show dramatic trends. For example, one might expect that median
household income is strongly correlated with election expenditures in a
community. After all, more income means more wealth, a stronger tax
base, and more money to spend. Yet, as Figure 8 shows, the relationship
is again flat.
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FIGURE 8: SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION EXPENDITURES
TO MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN CALIFORNIA

Notes: Municipalities are sized by population. Includes inferred observations
(highlighted by black borders). Extreme outliers not shown in the Figure.

These figures are suggestive, but they are, of course, grossly
incomplete. For four states and many variables of interest, one could
multiply these figures a hundred times over. Instead of presenting
reams of largely duplicative figures, Figure 9 combines all four states
and numerous variables (on a normalized scale).
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FIGURE 9: SCATTERPLOT OF NORMALIZED VARIABLES

Notes: Municipalities are sized by population. Includes observed and predicted
data. Extreme outliers not shown in the Figure.

Figure 9 once again shows flat trend lines, this time across all
four states and across numerous variables. This is an intuitive, though
of course also incomplete, way to summarize the data.
A more systematic way to structure the inquiry is through
regression analysis that includes a host of variables all at once (and,
potentially, all four states as well). That was, indeed, our starting point.
We intended to report the results of a series of models estimating
observed and predicted election administration expenditures. These
models used a variety of explanatory and control variables including
median household income, median age, nonwhite population
percentage, Hispanic and Latino population percentages, non-U.S.
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citizen percentages, educational achievement measures, female-tomale earnings ratios, employment status measures, mobility measures,
type and extent of health care coverage measures, poverty shares,
disability measures, and volume of government assistance recipients.
In short, these variables represented a smorgasbord of likely variables
that could explain community differences.
Despite this promise, our models turned out inconclusive. Most
commonly, the models lacked statistical or substantive significance.
Even where that was not the case, the direction of the effects swung
widely from one specification to the next. At this point, even if we found
a model specification that produced intelligible, clear, and statistically
significant coefficients, we would still be hesitant to report such a
model, as it might simply be the result of unintentional p-hacking.
We did not expect to find small coefficients that were barely
statistically significant or dependent on stumbling upon a fragile model
specification. The standard here was higher. Perhaps a model
specification we have not tried would produce statistically significant
coefficients, but we are not satisfied that the search for the just-so
model would be good enough. In the end, we do not report on these
models here because we lack confidence in them. The stakes are high,
and the data seems insufficient to draw strong inferences.105 The clear
implication is that our data does not allow us to claim that election
administration expenditures are systematically related to the
presumptive explanations of electoral disadvantage.106
But what about minority voter disadvantage? Perhaps the most
revealing aspect of our findings is that minority voter disadvantage is
seemingly not related to fiscal constraints. In light of this null finding,
what can be said about electoral marginalization? After all, it is
indisputably the case that minorities, living and voting in minority
communities, are often impaired by subpar election administration. The
Leadership Conference Education Fund recently reported:

105. Of course, this is not to say that more theoretical work on causal links might not lead the
way towards findings of clear causal effects. We strongly encourage such work. Our data and
analysis, however, simply do not presently support such claims.
106. There are many other possible explanations. For example, an unobserved independent
variable might drive election administration expenses (and also covary with a host of other
variables). Perhaps the most likely candidate for such a variable is local party politics. We did not
include this variable in our dataset in part because of significant theoretical and data-collection
difficulties (e.g., it is often difficult to determine which elected and nonelected officials drive
budgetary decisions over multiple years). That said, the UNC-Charlotte research team has
considered this possibility in North Carolina. See Zachary Mohr, JoEllen V. Pope, Martha E. Kropf
& Mary Jo Sheperd, Strategic Spending: Does Politics Influence Election Administration
Expenditure?, 63 AM. J. POL. SCI. 427 (2019) (finding that political partisanship does not appear to
influence election administration expenditures in North Carolina).
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[A] growing number of states and localities across the country have attempted to suppress
voter participation among Black and Brown communities in various ways. States have
shortened voting hours and days, enacted new barriers to voter registration, purged
millions of eligible votes from the rolls, implemented strict voter identification laws,
reshaped voting districts, and closed polling places. 107

The incongruity between our findings and common beliefs about the
fiscal deprivation of minority communities raises several interesting
possibilities, all of which should form the basis for future research.
One possibility is that our sample set does not include locations
in which minority voter disadvantage exists. This explanation is
unlikely, as our sample contains large, diverse cities including Houston,
Phoenix, and Los Angeles, in which minority voters are often confronted
with woeful election administration.108 A second possibility is that
roughly even election expenditures across counties and census tracts
obscure uneven needs. For example, minority populations may more
often require certain voting services, like ballot language assistance,
than is the case for other populations. If true, jurisdictions serving such
populations need excess funding, and even an equitable level of funding
would prove inadequate and result in a variety of cascading problems.
While possible, it seems unlikely that minority voters have unique
needs that are drastically different from others.
Another possibility is that election laws disproportionately
impact minority voters despite sufficient election expenditures. That is,
perhaps the right to vote is inherently fragile, thereby elevating the
significance of preexisting infirmities.109 Under this possibility, the
burdens on minority voters caused by, for instance, polling place
closures or cutbacks to early voting days, while very real, simply have
little to do with funding. If these burdens exist independent of any
cost concerns, a different set of non-expenditure-related reforms
are warranted.
107. THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS.,
DEMOCRACY DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE CLOSURES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 6 (2019),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/Democracy-Diverted.pdf [https://perma.cc/86B3-MH7E].
108. See, e.g., Alexa Ura, Harris County Clerk Apologizes to Voters, “Takes Full Responsibility”
for Long Waits to Vote in Houston, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/03/06/harris-county-clerk-apologizes-long-waits-vote-houston
[https://perma.cc/69YQ-ZWW4] (describing “excessively long lines experienced at voting sites
serving mostly black and Hispanic communities”); Dianna M. Náñez & Agnel Philip, Maricopa
County Residents Purged from Voter Rolls More Than 1 Million Times in Past Decade, AZCENTRAL,
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/04/minorities-poor-areas-mostaffected-maricopa-county-voter-purges/1855248002 (last updated Nov. 4, 2018, 1:47 PM)
[https://perma.cc/2V23-LEYU] (“Purges of inactive voters in Maricopa County over the past 10
years have disproportionately affected lower-income communities, where minorities make up a
larger share of the population . . . .”).
109. See Joshua S. Sellers & Justin Weinstein-Tull, Constructing the Right to Vote, 96 N.Y.U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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Finally, there is of course the possibility that our methodology
fails to capture the relevant unit of analysis. Perhaps counties, census
tracts, and municipalities are not where we should expect to find
election expenditure disparities. It is possible that such disparities
would only be revealed through more granular neighborhood
appraisals. Unfortunately, our data does not capture that level of detail.
We hope that others will use our data as a starting point for exploring
these possibilities.
C. Comparing Democracy and Burritos
Implicit in the previous figures is a measure of how much
municipalities and counties spend on elections. The numbers tend to be
quite low. Of course, there are numerous outliers, but typically, a
municipality spends only a few dollars per person on election work.
Counties tend to spend more, but still typically spend less than the price
of a burrito. This is a measure of absolute values. What about relative
expenditures? Figure 10 shows absolute and relative investments in
election administration. Each dot represents a municipality in one of
the four states where we collected data. The vertical axis shows election
expenditures in absolute terms. The horizontal axis shows election
expenditures in relative terms (the percentage of the municipal budget
devoted to election work).
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FIGURE 10: SCATTERPLOT OF MUNICIPAL ABSOLUTE AND
RELATIVE ELECTION ADMINISTRATION EXPENDITURES

As the Figure makes clear, most municipalities spend less than
one percent of their budgets on elections.110 Many spend far less. Figure
10 also suggests that municipalities that spend more on elections in
absolute terms also spend more on elections in relative terms. As Figure
11 shows, the same applies to county expenditures.

110. By contrast, local governments often spend around five percent of their general
expenditures on police protection. BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’ T OF JUST., STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON POLICE PROTECTION IN THE U.S., 2000-2017, at 1, 6 (2020),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/slgeppus0017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPF4-9UDT].
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FIGURE 11: SCATTERPLOT OF COUNTY ABSOLUTE AND
RELATIVE ELECTION ADMINISTRATION EXPENDITURES

Most observed counties spend less than ten dollars per capita on
elections, and very few spend more than twenty dollars per capita.
Election administration in most counties accounts for less than one
percent of their expenditures, though there are more outliers here than
in Figure 10.111
111. See Auburn Professor and National Institute for Election Administration Research and
Practice Director Comments on Election Technology in Light of Iowa Caucus Issues, AUBURN
UNIV. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://ocm.auburn.edu/experts/2020/02/041249-iowa-caucus-issues.php
[https://perma.cc/48WA-3F7Q] (“[O]ur study indicates that the average portion of a county budget
spent on election operations is about 0.5 percent—more or less in some places of course, but likely
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IV. REIMAGINING DOCTRINE
Overall, one of the animating purposes of this project is to
inspire further thinking about the relationship between election
expenditures and election law doctrines. How might expenditure data
be relevant in election law litigation? This Part responds to the findings
and explores potential doctrines under which election expenditures
might be considered.
A clarifying point at the outset: our data collection was focused
on inputs. Given the consistently expressed need by election
administrators for more money, we wanted to uncover how much money
is being spent, on average, and whether any identifiable spending
patterns exist. As noted above, we largely found election expenditures
to be idiosyncratic. This general finding renders inapposite many of the
most common election law claims. Absent evidence of spending
disparities
between
majority-minority
and
majority-white
communities, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which forbids any
“standard, practice, or procedure . . . which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color,”112 is unviable. Likewise, with no evidence of
the intentional deprivation of election expenditures to select
communities, Fourteenth Amendment claims based on intentional
discrimination are rendered moot.
The larger point is that any viable legal claim premised on
unequal or inadequate election expenditures rests on the ability to show
a demonstrable link between spending (inputs) and the quality of
election administration (outputs). Our data is focused only on the
former. Consequently, the legal analysis that follows is speculative. We
wish there were a data repository tracking election performance at the
local level—something akin to what the MIT Election Data and Science
Lab provides for the state level.113 If so, we could easily compare our
data against various indicators of election administration and highlight
where poor election administration corresponds to low spending.
But that is currently not possible. Presuming possession of the relevant
information, however, we believe the doctrines discussed below
are germane.

less than 1 percent most everywhere. That is not a lot of investment for the government function
that
undergirds
our democracy.”).
112. 52 U.S.C. § 10301.
113. Election Performance Index: Indicators, MIT ELECTION DATA & SCI. LAB., https://
elections.mit.edu/#/data/indicators (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/NBG7-XRV].
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A. Bush v. Gore as Precedent
Section I.C briefly introduced the possibility of relying on Bush
v. Gore as a basis for challenging the differential treatment of voters.114
Recall that the case suggested that “arbitrary and disparate treatment”
of voters by a state is unconstitutional.115 Also recall that the import
given to this pronouncement is widely contested, with some arguing
that it applies, if at all, only to circumstances nearly indistinguishable
from those of the case, and others arguing that it introduced a new legal
basis to contest differential voter treatment more broadly. A thorough
summary of the debate is outside the scope of this Article, but, in his
comprehensive analysis of Bush v. Gore’s jurisprudential legacy,
Michael Morley concludes that the decision’s “Uniformity Principle,”116
the principle mandating the uniform treatment of voters, “has evolved
into a fully enforceable, generally applicable election-law doctrine.”117
In short, it is plausible that Bush v. Gore can be relied on to challenge
intercounty disparities in election expenditures when such disparities
are found to meaningfully influence voter services.
Consider the following scenario. Imagine a county, flush with
cash, in which county election officials decide to adopt a state-of-the-art
voting machine. The machine is easy to use, efficient, virtually
unhackable, and records votes in both electronic and paper forms.
Further, the county can afford to pay a large number of election staffers
to guide voters through the process of using the machine without
difficulty. Voters in the county universally laud the voting process, and
voter error rates are nonexistent.
Now assume the neighboring county, which is demographically
indistinguishable and of similar size, is cash strapped. Its voters cast
their ballots on decades-old electronic voting machines that are
challenging to operate, highly vulnerable to cyberattack, and do not
provide a paper trail. Polling place assistance exists, but is minimal,
and voters routinely leave the polling site unsure if their preferences
were accurately recorded. Error rates exceed those found elsewhere in
the state. Voters in the county detest the voting process and many have
withdrawn from participation due to frustration. Are these voters
simply out of luck?

114. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); supra Section I.C.
115. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05.
116. Michael T. Morley, Bush v. Gore’s Uniformity Principle and the Equal Protection of the
Right to Vote, 28 GEO. MASON L. REV. 229, 231 (2020).
117. Id. at 233.
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This scenario provides an example of when a Bush v. Gore-style
challenge based around disparate resources might be sensible.118 Voters
in the county with the outdated voting machines should have standing
to challenge the comparative financial inadequacy of their election
system. Of course, and to reiterate, any allegations based on such
intercounty disparities would need to be tethered to actual voting
problems.119 And it would be necessary to trace the funding disparity to
a decision made by state or local officials.120 Thorny questions will
undoubtedly arise about administrative costs, funding streams, and
unfulfilled obligations.121 But, where record evidence establishes a link
between election expenditures and electoral disadvantage, we believe
Bush v. Gore should serve as a precedent on which litigants can rely.
Perhaps a challenge could be structured around findings of the
sort we provide in this Article—per capita election funding. As noted in
Part II, our findings are most probative when used to compare
neighboring or similarly situated counties. It is worth repeating that
complete equality in election spending is both implausible and unwise;
it fails to capture local idiosyncrasies. When jurisdictions can be fairly
compared, however, the Equal Protection Clause might be interpreted
to require substantial equality of election services across counties
within each state. Thus, when a cash-strapped county with limited
polling sites has substantially higher voter wait times than like
counties in the state, such a disparity would be actionable. A claim of
this sort is most promising where state (opposed to local) officials
largely oversee and finance elections and where funding and budgetary
decisions can be scrutinized.
Incidentally, plaintiffs who challenged Georgia’s election system
in 2019 made a version of this claim. As background, the 2018 election
in Georgia—in which nearly four million votes were cast—was centered
around the gubernatorial election between Secretary of State Brian
Kemp and former minority leader in the Georgia House of
Representatives Stacey Abrams. Following Kemp’s election, Abrams
118. See Hasen, supra note 55, at 206 (“[I]f county discretion leads to significantly greater
opportunities to vote for voters in some counties rather than others, an equal protection claim
seems plausible.”).
119. See Morley, supra note 116, at 262 (“Courts have also invalidated substantial variations
among localities’ election procedures or resources that led to disparities in voting opportunities.”).
120. See generally Edward B. Foley, Refining the Bush v. Gore Taxonomy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1035 (2007) (providing a useful taxonomy of hypothetical Bush v. Gore-type claims). Foley exhibits
skepticism of at least one version of the claim we endorse. Id. at 1047 (“A local ballot shortage
caused by the locality’s mistaken interpretation of a statewide mandate would obviously be much
less easy to justify than a local ballot shortage caused by a deliberate, budget-cutting decision
pursuant to express legislative authority to make this local policy choice.”).
121. See Sellers & Scharff, supra note 73, at 1395–96; Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra
note 109.
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formed an organization—Fair Fight Action—that challenged multiple
aspects of Georgia’s election system.122
The organization’s amended complaint contains a wide variety
of claims, including one alleging that “Georgia’s voting system [ ]
violates Equal Protection because voters are subject to arbitrary and
inconsistent differences in rules, processes, and burdens depending on
where voters happen to reside.” 123 By “abdicating their responsibilities
under state law,”124 the complaint argues, state officials “have allowed
the voting processes in the 159 counties in Georgia to devolve into an
arbitrary and inconsistent web of actual laws, erroneous
interpretations of laws, and local rules that are often unannounced
until applied to a voter. These inconsistent, nonuniform rules subject
voters to unequal voting strength.”125 Citing Bush v. Gore, the
complaint accuses state officials of turning a blind eye to shortcomings
within certain local election systems and to the differential allocation of
resources across counties.126 The type of data we provide offers, at a
minimum, a useful supplement to claims of this sort.
Finally, the plausibility of a claim rooted in Bush v. Gore, or the
Equal Protection Clause generally, is strengthened by the
categorization of the right to vote as a fundamental right.127
Unconstitutional abridgment or deprivation of the right to vote need
not occur through express prohibition or restraint; government failure
to facilitate the right to vote is also constitutionally problematic. Put
differently, guaranteeing the right to vote, yet failing to finance the
necessary apparatus for voters to effectively exercise that right, is
unconstitutional (in)activity.128 In sum, election expenditure data
permits intercounty comparisons that enhance litigants’ claims to
equality in the distribution of election services.

122. See Jelani Cobb, Stacey Abrams’s Fight for a Fair Vote, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/19/stacey-abrams-fight-for-a-fair-vote
[https://perma.cc/32WF-9MTP]. The litigation was initially entitled Fair Fight Action, Inc. v.
Raffensperger. E.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, No. 18-cv05391 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2019), ECF No. 159-1. Fair Fight Action, Inc. has since dropped out of
the litigation, which is now entitled Ebenezer Baptist Church of Atlanta v. Raffensperger.
123. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 72, Fair Fight Action, Inc.
v. Raffensperger, No. 18-cv-05391 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2019), ECF No. 41.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 72–73.
126. Id.
127. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–67 (1966).
128. See Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra note 109.
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B. Electoral Adequacy
As emphasized throughout this Article, the absence of election
expenditure data stifles reform efforts. Data along the lines of what we
provide here introduces the possibility of a legal claim premised on the
notion of electoral adequacy. The notion of adequacy in the electoral
context is conceptually tricky, yet it avoids the challenges presented by
equality arguments. Moreover, the concept of adequacy has been
helpfully explicated in the context of education reform litigation.129
As background, advocates for educational equity initially
brought claims seeking equal, or roughly equal, educational spending
per pupil.130 That strategy shifted in 1989 at the start of what is
conventionally known as the “third wave” of education litigation,131
after which plaintiffs sought not equality per se, but instead, a minimal,
or adequate, level of educational services to which children are entitled.
As summarized by Richard Briffault,
Under the adequacy theory, the constitutional violation is not that school districts depend
on drastically unequal property tax bases or that per pupil expenditures vary across
districts largely according to local wealth, but that the state government has failed to
assure that all public school children in the state are receiving an adequate education.132

The success of the shift towards educational adequacy—one
study puts litigants’ success rate at sixty percent—turned on the
general amenability of state officials to educational standards, 133 as
well
as
judges’
willingness
to
creatively
utilize
their
remedial authority.134 How might these lessons be applied in the
electoral context?
129. For a fuller examination of the concept of adequacy in the educational and election
litigation contexts, see id.
130. William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation of
Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1901 (2017) (“Although early litigation
focused on the development of the right to equal per-pupil funding, or at least a school finance
scheme not dependent upon local property wealth, more recent litigation has sought to define
qualitatively the substantive education to which children are constitutionally entitled.”);
Caroline M. Hoxby, All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal, 16 Q.J. ECON. 1189,
1189–92 (2001).
131. Koski, supra note 130, at 1904.
132. Richard Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity: The Evolving Legal Theory of School
Finance Reform 1–2 (Columbia L. Sch. Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 06-111; Princeton L. &
Pub. Affs. Working Paper, Paper No. 06-013, 2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=906145 [https://perma.cc/ZRE5-VU8W]; see Koski, supra note 130, at 1904 (“An
adequate education is understood to mean a specific qualitative level of educational resources or,
focusing on outcomes, a specific level of resources required to achieve certain educational outcomes
based on external and fixed standards.”).
133. Koski, supra note 130, at 1906.
134. Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to Representational Adequacy: A
New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1631–
32 (2018).
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For one, serious theoretical work needs to be done regarding
what a baseline level of election services should entail. In the
educational context, policymakers and judges made precise
determinations about everything from library holdings to the number
of calculators needed in a trigonometry class.135 We need similar, deep
thinking about election administration analogues.136
Second, we need more reliable data about election spending. As
is true for all rights, at some point, fiscal considerations must be
broached, as appropriations choices are inevitably informed by
available funds. Education reformers have the benefit of transparency
when it comes to educational spending. Until we have a better sense of
what is currently being spent in the election context, pragmatic
recommendations remain challenging.
Third, reformers need to construct viable legal theories in
support of the notion of electoral adequacy. School finance plaintiffs
evolved their theories from equity, to adequacy, and beyond.137
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that inequitably
funded school districts violate the Equal Protection Clause, 138 legal
challenges are now typically brought under state constitutions. State
constitutions also provide a promising, though completely undeveloped,
avenue for electoral adequacy claims.
Josh Douglas identifies several states with constitutions in
which elections are guaranteed to be either “free and open” or “free and
equal.”139 These provisions provide a textual hook on which electoral
adequacy claims might be brought, a textual hook that is not
qualitatively different than the state constitutional provisions
promising “thorough and efficient” or “general and uniform”
educational systems. A successful electoral adequacy claim might order
state legislatures to clarify the maximum amount of time that voters should wait in line
to vote, how many voting machines per capita each jurisdiction is required to maintain,
how poll workers are to be trained, or how much money each jurisdiction is to receive from
the state for election technology.140

In sum, electoral adequacy warrants further analysis.

135. Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra note 109.
136. Id.
137. See generally Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195 (2011) (discussing the traditional legal theories and
arguing for a new approach, the “broken system theory”).
138. 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973).
139. Douglas, supra note 67, at 144–49.
140. Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra note 109.
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C. Broadening the Balancing Test
In addition to challenges based on Bush v. Gore or state
constitutions, the aforementioned Anderson-Burdick standard of
review might be expanded to account for inadequate election
expenditures. We refer to “expanding” or “broadening” the balancing
test simply because, to date, assessments of election administration
resources have not meaningfully factored into the doctrine. Recall that
Anderson-Burdick balances burdens on voters against state interests.141
If a state or county enacts a severe burden on the right to vote, that
restriction will be subject to strict scrutiny.142 By contrast, if the
restriction is “evenhanded” and “protect[s] the integrity and reliability
of the electoral process,”143 courts balance the burden on the voter
“against the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as justifications
for the burden imposed by its rule.’ ”144
It is uncommon for courts to find that government regulations
constitute severe burdens on voters. That said, Anderson-Burdick
introduced a self-consciously “flexible standard” that might have
traction here.145 Take the earlier example about voting machines.
Voters in the impoverished county are arguably subjected to an
impermissible burden on their right to vote: their voting experience is
laborious, and most notably, the sanctity of their votes is shaky, given
the vulnerability of the voting machines and the lack of a paper trail.
The reason the county has not upgraded its machines is because it
cannot afford to do so. Under Anderson-Burdick, state and local
governments should, we believe, be subjected to exacting scrutiny that
requires an explanation as to why their elections are inadequately
funded. This is essentially another type of electoral adequacy claim, as
outlined in the previous Section.
Many questions might be raised about the county’s fiscal
decisions under the balancing test. Sticking with the example, what
interests can the county advance in defense of its use of a problematic
voting machine? Are fiscal constraints alone sufficient to justify the
county’s choice to maintain the status quo? To take another example,
could a county close a large number of polling sites in the interest of,
say, balancing its budget? And when would voters have a right of action
against the state in response to such closures?

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008).
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
Id. at 190 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
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These are difficult questions that we hope to tackle in depth in
future work. For now, we simply suggest that litigants supplement
traditional legal theories with claims regarding election expenditures.
Whether under Bush v. Gore, state constitutions, or Anderson-Burdick,
we believe there is doctrinal space for novel arguments along
these lines.
D. Race to the Top?
One of the fundamental difficulties in answering the questions
presented above is the absence of an agreement about what a baseline
level of voting services entails. How long is too long to wait in line at a
polling site? Is a paper trail for an electronic voting machine essential?
How many early voting days, if any, should be provided? Fundamental
differences of opinion over these issues are widespread.
If, as posited above, election law doctrines begin to account for
intercounty disparities in election expenditures that relate to voting
irregularities or inequalities, would this effectively require a statewide
leveling up of election services? Put differently, do intercounty
comparisons necessitate equality of services? We do not think so. For
one, there are many reasons to favor local experimentation in the realm
of election administration.146 We should encourage creative efforts to
expedite the voting experience, increase the number of available voting
days, and expand the electorate to nonvoting populations.
Election administration is not an area where a one-size-fits-all
approach is sensible, and a simplistic emphasis on costs alone elides
this complexity.
Second, we should remain sensitive to the possibility that there
is waste and inefficiency within the election system that can be
eliminated without compromising electoral equity. The elimination of
such waste could result in lowering election expenditures. Simply
because one county or city makes such changes should not bring that
146. Sellers & Scharff, supra note 73, at 1400–02; see Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954, 975 (2019):
Local governments, the argument goes, serve as critical sites for democratic
participation and local political engagement. Local participation reinforces bedrock
public values as people learn to cooperate to solve problems that face much more
significant collective-action challenges at larger scales. As a result, local governments
have a distinctive capacity to reflect community needs in polities that foster local voice;
Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1233 (2018) (“City
power is necessary to vindicate the values of diversity, majority rule, and local self-government.”);
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term — Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (2010) (“[S]ome think that localities represent better sites for pursuing
federalism’s values because they are closer to the people, offer more realistic options for voting
with one’s feet, and map more closely onto communities of interest.”).
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jurisdiction under scrutiny merely because it spends less on elections
than a comparable jurisdiction. Again, to the extent that election
expenditures are legally relevant, it is because of their relationship to
inadequate voter services.
In short, even under the doctrinal possibilities explored above,
we do not endorse a legal requirement mandating that all counties
within a state emulate the single county that seemingly runs elections
the best. That said, we reiterate our belief that policymakers, judges,
and other experts should create standards for assessing election
administration performance.147 These standards should, in our view,
exceed the current legal floor that prohibits only outright
discrimination or manifest injustices.148
All of this heightens the urgency and importance of gathering
more data to further explore the currently obscure relationship between
election expenditures and election services. With that data, the
likelihood of doctrinal evolution premised on disparate election
expenditures will increase.149
V. OTHER REFORM PROPOSALS
This Part very briefly weighs the pros and cons of several
nondoctrinal proposals for election administration reform. Overall, we
believe that more money should be spent on election administration.
In what follows, we explore several policy proposals pertaining
to election funding. Importantly, most of these proposals are not
mutually exclusive.
A. Direct Aid
Sometimes the most obvious solution is the best one: perhaps we
should just give more money to counties and cities to administer
elections. Certainly, plenty of anecdotal evidence suggests that local
officials feel resource deprived. Direct aid is most sensible when
administered as part of an aid formula.150 Unconditional direct aid
147. Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra note 109.
148. See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (noting that only “severe” restrictions on voting rights
receive the highest level of legal scrutiny).
149. In addition, as noted above, more data demonstrating similar expenditures across
counties will allow for the rejection of insincere claims by county and city governments that their
inability to meet a minimum standard of election services is funding related.
150. See Bo Zhao & Katharine Bradbury, Designing State Aid Formulas, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 278, 279 (2009) (“A large portion of state aid is distributed through formulas, some of
which allocate categorical grants for specific programs, some of which provide unconditional lumpsum grants aimed at general fiscal equalization, and many of which fall somewhere in between.”).
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that affords local governments complete discretion is inadvisable in
this context.151
Aid that is tethered to local needs provides the best chance at
electoral equity.152 As discussed in the previous Part, the absence of
standards for assessing election administration performance
complicates our ability to make suggestions that are overly categorical.
We are confident, however, in claiming that many local governments
are currently under resourced and that state governments (and ideally
the federal government) should provide additional funds in support of
increased and improved election services.153
B. Mandated Spending Levels
Though direct aid tied to a well-crafted aid formula may be the
best solution, there are several alternatives worth considering. One
alternative involves states mandating certain spending levels by local
governments. This would, at first glance, seem to accomplish the same
leveling up as direct aid (with conditions), yet would preserve a greater
degree of local control.
The drawback to this suggested solution is the potential
discordance between spending levels and the quality of election
services. Simply mandating spending levels does nothing to ensure that
local governments use their resources wisely. County officials might
invest in robust cybersecurity measures while failing to pay for a
sufficient number of polling sites. Moreover, the prophylactic nature of
this reform does not account for local tailoring. As noted above,
spending levels, while probative—particularly when they are woefully
low—do not tell a complete story. It would be foolish to mandate
increased spending levels in a jurisdiction that currently excels at
election administration.
Finally, for financially struggling jurisdictions, this proposal
would require redirecting sparse resources away from other
underfunded responsibilities, including public schools and public

151. At least until a threshold of electoral equality is achieved.
152. See COMM. ON NAT’L STAT., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STATISTICAL
ISSUES IN ALLOCATING FUNDS BY FORMULA 21–22 (Thomas A. Louis, Thomas B. Jabine & Marisa
A. Gerstein eds., 2003) (describing how aid programs can encourage spending on certain
local services).
153. Essentially, we are advocating for “categorical equity” in elections. See Helen F. Ladd &
John Yinger, The Case for Equalizing Aid, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 211, 212 (1994) (“The most fundamental
equity argument for equalizing aid is categorical equity, which exists when all citizens have fair
access to public services that are thought to be particularly important to their opportunities
in life.”).
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benefits programs. On balance, we do not find this particular reform to
be promising.
C. Nonlocal Election Administration
Greater state involvement in and oversight of elections are
additional commonly proposed solutions to electoral dysfunction.154
Legally, local governments lack sovereignty and, as such, enjoy no
inviolable protection against state intrusion.155 Even local governments
that have been afforded “home rule” are not fully protected from state
preemption.156 Consequently, if a state chooses to completely run
elections on its own, without local government involvement, the state’s
decision would, in most instances, be sound.
On the other hand, states have come to rely on local
governments to administer elections and, for the most part, have no
vested interest in the outcome of minor local elections.157 In addition,
complete state-level management of elections would conceivably cost
the state a significant sum, perhaps more than states would prefer to
pay; at a minimum, a reallocation of state/local funds would be required.
Relatedly, state management would require assembling a team of
officials to oversee election administration.
Nevertheless, this is a potentially promising reform effort. The
United States is an outlier in the way it manages elections. Most of the
world has moved towards centralization, sometimes partisan,
sometimes not.158 Our highly decentralized process, while justifiably
protective of innovation, contains inefficiencies that could be mitigated
through greater state consolidation and control.159

154. Greater federal involvement is less commonly endorsed due to both political and
constitutional constraints. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof . . . .”). That said, political constraints aside, Congress possesses expansive
authority to regulate “most electoral levels and topics.” Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Sweep of
the Electoral Power, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 62),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3715826 [https://perma.cc/8BLL-3978].
155. Sellers & Scharff, supra note 73, at 1371–74; Richard C. Schragger, The Political
Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 115–17 (2017).
156. Sellers & Scharff, supra note 73, at 1373.
157. For a detailed overview and analysis of state preemption in the electoral context, see id.
158. Daniel P. Tokaji, Comparative Election Administration: A Legal Perspective on Electoral
Institutions, in COMPARATIVE ELECTION LAW (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7–8),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3500868 [https://perma.cc/D4P6-GRAT].
159. See generally ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE (2009) (describing the impact of local variation on voting practices in the United States).
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D. Forced Consolidation and Soft Consolidation
A final possibility involves the forced consolidation of multiple
small communities into mega-election-administration districts. Such
districts could then allocate funding among localities. School districts
often do just that; they combine multiple towns, townships, villages,
cities, and unincorporated areas into one big district that then
redistributes resources and sets policies among schools. The analogy to
schools is telling because history suggests massive resistance to such
efforts (e.g., busing schemes to integrate schools). Potentially, there
would be significant local resistance to forced consolidation schemes in
this context as well.
But election administration and schooling are also not analogous
in important ways. Perhaps most centrally, election administration
typically does not create the same visceral responses as questions of
where one’s children will spend a good chunk of each day. Also, as
Section III.C showed, most communities devote less than one percent of
their budget to election administration tasks. Education, by contrast,
takes up a sizable chunk of local budgets.160 Equalizing election
administration funding would thus be a smaller task (compared to
overall expenditures) than equalizing education funding.
Perhaps the bigger roadblock to forced consolidation schemes is
geographical in nature: well-funded electoral jurisdictions are often not
adjacent to their poorer neighbors. A geographically contiguous megaelection-district is only sometimes possible. The best hope for this
proposal is to shift more and more responsibilities from municipalities
to counties that can then equalize resources. In states with few and
similarly situated counties, this could go a long way towards equalizing
election funding. But in states with many counties that are not
similarly situated (e.g., Texas), shifting more power towards counties
will do little to equalize resources for the bulk of the population. In these
locations, nonlocal election consolidation is preferable.
Beyond forced consolidation is the possibility of soft
consolidation,
where
municipalities
retain
their
separate
administrations and responsibilities, but states create structures
designed to scale solutions cheaply and efficiently. For example, a state
might create a nonobligatory program to purchase technology where
160. See
Elementary
and
Secondary
Education
Expenditures,
URB.
INST.,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-financeinitiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/elementary-and-secondary-education-expenditures#
(last visited Mar. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DDL6-5V2H] (“In 2017, state and local governments
spent $660 billion, or more than one-fifth (21 percent) of direct general spending, on elementary
and secondary education.”).
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municipalities can freely opt in. This proposal would protect local
control and local agency while leveraging economies of scale. If a
sufficient number of such programs exist, and a sufficient number of
municipalities decide to opt in, this would create a quasi-consolidated
election district.
CONCLUSION
This project only scratches the surface of what remains to be
discovered about election expenditures. Nevertheless, this Article has
highlighted both how little money is spent on protecting and preserving
our most fundamental right—the right to vote—and how much
spending variance exists between cities and counties, even those that
border one another. The latter revelation introduces a multitude of
fruitful lines of inquiry for scholars to pursue.
Beyond the data collection, though, we also offered preliminary
thoughts on how our data implicates doctrinal and policy issues
pertaining to election administration. Despite its significance, election
funding does not meaningfully factor into existing election law
doctrines or remedies. We suspect this is due to a lack of data and the
enormous complexity associated with “following the money” in our
highly decentralized election system. Yet, when financial shortfalls are
the cause of electoral disadvantage, perhaps litigants should more
forcefully draw out the connections between those disadvantages and
identifiable resource disparities. Perhaps democracy on a shoestring is
only a partial democracy at best.

2021]

DEMOCRACY ON A SHOESTRING
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1
FIGURE 1 (ALTERNATE): OBSERVED PER CAPITA
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN CALIFORNIA

Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a band surrounding
the state median.
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APPENDIX 2
FIGURE 6 (ALTERNATE): SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION
EXPENDITURES TO NON-WHITE POPULATION FOR
MUNICIPALITIES IN CALIFORNIA – OBSERVED ONLY

Notes: Municipalities are sized by population.
Extreme outliers removed from Figure.
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APPENDIX 3
FIGURE 7 (ALTERNATE): SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION
EXPENDITURES TO NON-WHITE POPULATION FOR
MUNICIPALITIES IN TEXAS – OBSERVED ONLY

Notes: Municipalities are sized by population.
Extreme outliers removed from Figure.
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